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STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY:
THE RULES REGARDING STATE ENTERPRISES,
ENTITIES, AND SUBNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
Thomas W Waelde*
PatriciaK. Wouters*

I. INTRODUCTION.
The recent adoption of the Energy Charter Treaty' (ECT) has been

hailed by the business community as "putting teeth" into transnational
economic relations in the field of energy. Certainly, as with many

important international agreements finalized only after much negotiation
and compromise, the ECT has its strengths and shortcomings.2
One of the interesting features of the ECT is the attempt to codify

an area of state responsibility that presents some particularly difficult
issues regarding the liability of states for the conduct of state enterprises,
entities and subnational authorities operating in the field covered by the
Treaty. The ECT requires state parties to ensure that state enterprises and

other "privileged entities" conduct their operations in a manner consistent

* Professor of Petroleum, Mineral and InternationalInvestment Law, Executive Director,
Centrefor Petroleumand MineralLaw andPolicy, University of Dundee; Law Degree (Frankfurt);
LL.M. (Harvard);Dr.Jur. (Frankfurt).
** Lecturer of InternationalResources Law, Centrefor Petroleum and Mineral Law and
Policy, University ofDundee;LL.B. (Ottawa);LL.M. (Berkeley); Ph.D Candidate(GraduateInstitute
ofInternationalStudies, Geneva). The authors thank Dr. Werner Simon, UN Law Library (Geneva)
for his assistancewith obtainingresearch materials and Dr.Sergei Vinogradovfor his comments
on earlierdrafts of this work
1. The Energy Charter Treaty, 33 ILM 360 (1994) (with commentary by Thomas Waelde).
2. See generally THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Thomas W. Waelde ed., 1995); Thomas

NV. Waelde, InternationalInvestment Under the 1994 Energy CharterTreaty - Legal, Negotiating
and Policy Implications for International Investors within Western and Commonwealth of
Independent States/EasternEuropean Countries, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1995).
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with the Treaty.3 Each state party is also obliged to "take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by
4
regional and local governments and authorities within its Area."
These provisions raise important issues with respect to the international responsibility of the state parties to the ECT. What is the
substantive content of the rules contained in the ECT? To what extent
does the lex specialis of the ECT modify existing rules of general
international law in the field of state responsibility? This article examines
these issues beginning with a survey of the general intemation
al law in the field of state responsibility.
1.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY.

5

The notion of international responsibility arose as early as there
were contacts between states. Grotius and Vattel each referred to state
responsibility in the context of the duties owed by states to foreign
citizens, although notably, the obligations involved existed only at the
state level. Thus, injury to an alien was actionable only because it was
fictionalized to be an injury to the state. The origins of state responsibility are also found in doctrinal writings concerning the diplomatic
protection of nationals and injuries to aliens.6 More recently, human
rights law has contributed to the doctrinal underpinnings of state
responsibility with respect to the obligations owed by states to private

3. ECT, art. 22, supra note 1 at 397; see infra p.112.
4. ECT, art. 23 supra note 1 at 397; see infra p. 113; see also NVaelde "International
Investment", supra note 2 at 65-6.
5. State responsibility refers to the liability of States for internationally wrongful acts. The
responsibility of a State gives rise to a set ofnew legal relationships between the offending State and
victim. On the topic of state responsibility, see generally SHABTAi ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 33-378 (1991). See also
CHIrTHARANJAN F. AMERASiNGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1967); IAN
BROwNLE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1990); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE
R.SPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928); RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (F.V. Garcia-Amador et al. eds., 1984);
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOP INJURY TO ALIENS (Robert B. Lillich ed.,
1983); BRIAN C. SMITH, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT: THE RULES OF
DECISION (1988); Richard B. Lillich, Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens,161
RECumL DES CouRS de I'ACADtMIE INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] III 329 (1978).
6. For a survey of the historical development of the lav in this area, see Richard B. Lillich,

The CurrentStatus ofthe Law ofState ResponsibilityforInjuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1, 1-7 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983); see also
IAN BROWNLrE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1-9 (1983).
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persons.7 In addition, the rapid expansion of international commercial
activity has added a new dimension to the traditional rules of state
responsibility. It is in this context that the provisions of the ECT relating
to subnational authorities and state enterprises are so important.
The United Nations first undertook study of the topic of state
responsibility as an important item on the first agenda of the International
Law Commission (ILC)8 in 1949. Work on the topic has yet to be
completed. There have been four Rapporteurs to date 9 and only Part One
of the Draft Articles on state responsibility has been approved by the
Commission.1 °
The classic rules of state responsibility are reflected generally in the
work of the ILC' which take the form of Draft Articles. These provide
that conduct attributable to a state of a breach of an international
obligation will result in international responsibility. This creates a new
relationship between the offending state and the victim state whereby the
former is liable for reparation to the latter. Article 3 of the ILC's Draft
Articles sets forth two key elements for an internationally wrongful act:
Article 3. Elements of an internationallywrongful act of a State
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when:
(a) Conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under international law; and
(b) That conduct constitutes
a breach of an international
12
obligation of the State.
The Draft Articles set forth two further conditions that may apply
in the overall scheme of state responsibility. In every case, there must be

7. See Stephen D. Ramsey, State Responsibility Under the Restatement 83 PROC. AM. Soc'y
INT'L L. 232, 233-34 (1989); see also Lillich, supra note 6 at 9.
8. The International Law Commission is the group of international lawyers appointed in their
private capacity to assist the United Nations in the progressive development and codification of
international law.
9. F.V. Garcia-Amador, 1955-1961 (6 reports); Roberto Ago 1962-1979 (8 reports); Willem
Riphagen, 1980-1986 (7 reports); Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, 1987-1996 (8 reports).
10. Thirty-two articles were adopted by the Comnssion between 1973-79; see Rosenne, supra

note 50 at 1.
11. See DraftArticles on State Responsibility, [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 276, U.N. Sales
No. E.75V.7 (Part I); see also Draft Articles on State Responsibility, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS

CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 325 (Marina Spinedi & Bruno Simma eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Draft Articles]; for a bibliography on the codification of state responsibility by the
United Nations, see id. at 395. See also Marina Spinedi, Synopsis ofthe Proceedingsof the ILC and
of the Oral and Written Comments By States Relating to the Draft Articles on State Responsibility

Adopted on First Reading, id. 349-390.
12.

Id. at 325.
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an examination of whether the state conduct in question may be justified.
This is required where certain circumstances exist that preclude the
wrongfulness of the state conduct complained of. 3 The second condition, exhaustion of local remedies, applies to cases where private
individuals are involved as potential victims. In those situations, there is
no internationally wrongful act until all local remedies have been
exhausted.14 The state alleged to have injured an alien's interest must
be given every legitimate opportunity to deal with the matter domestically. Whether this rule of international law applies in cases involving
transnational corporations has been questioned" and this may be an
issue under the ECT given the structure of its dispute settlement
mechanism. 6
The second constituent element of state responsibility is the
attribution to the state of the offending conduct.' 7 Attribution is one of
the threshold tests in the operation of the traditional model of state
responsibility. The ILC's formula involves a two-step approach: First,
conduct (an action or omission) that potentially breaches an obligation
of the state under international law must be identified; second, that
conduct must be attributed to a state. The ILC has described this process
as involving an "objective" test in the first step (i.e., identifying the
violation) and a "subjective" test in the second step (i.e., attributing the
act to the state).'"
The doctrine of attribution is complicated and complex at both the

13. See Chapter V, ILC Draft Articles, Articles 29-34. Id. at 332.
14. For the technical procedure for adjudicating nationals' claims, see RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR ADJUDICATION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS 5-6 (1962) (setting

forth the conditions requisite to proceed with an individual's international claim).
15. ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE USE

IT 153 (1994).
16. Waelde "International Investment", supra note 2 at 60.

17. On attribution, see Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, State Fault and the Forms and Degrees of
InternationalResponsibility: Questions ofAttribution and Relevance, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
AUx SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET Du DEVELOPPEMENT 25 (1991); Chittharanjan F.

Amerasinghe, Imputability in the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 22 REVUE
EGYPTIENNE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 91 (1966); G. Arangio-Ruiz, L'Etat dans le sens du Droit
des Gens et la Notion de Droit international,26 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFENTLICHES

RECHT 265 (1976); Luigi Condorelli, L'Imputation t I Etat d'un FaitInternationalementlilicite:
Solutions Classiques et Nouvelles Tendances, 189 RECUEIL DE COURS D'ACADEMIE DE DRoiT
INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] VI 9 (1984); Gordon A. Christenson, The Doctrineof Attribution in
State Responsibilityin INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 321
(Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983).
18. See HIGGINS, supra note 15 at 149 for a discussion on distinction.
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theoretical and practical levels. 9 Its importance in the overall scheme
of state responsibility is self-evident. If the conduct complained of cannot
be connected to a state, there is no wrongful act. Complications arise
where non-state actors such as state enterprises, entities and subnational
authorities are involved. In such instances, it must be determined whether
conduct by these bodies may be attributed to the state. A related
complexity is the threshold for attribution where the actors are not direct
state officials or authorities. For example, can the state be held responsible for the activities of parastatal actors?
The attribution aspect of state responsibility has been addressed in
the Commission's Draft Articles. The ILC has identified six relevant
categories of actors at the domestic level: (i) organs of the state; (ii)
"other entities" empowered to exercise elements of governmental
authority; (iii) persons acting on behalf of the state; (iv) persons not
acting on behalf of the state; (v) organs placed at the disposal of the state
by another state or international organization; and (vi) organs of an
insurrectional movement. Generally, the conduct of the actors in the first
three categories will be attributed to the state, while conduct by the latter
three categories will not. However, there appear to be exceptions for each
general category and in the end, the particular facts of each situation
must be considered. Relevant actors for this essay are those described in
categories (ii) & (iv) above (the "other entities" and persons acting on
behalf of the state.) These categories of actors are analyzed in the context
of liability of the state for the acts of state enterprises and entities,
regional governments, subnational authorities, and private persons.
The ILC covers the acts of regional governments and subnational
authorities in Articles 7 and 10 of its Draft Articles. 0 Article 721
attributes to the state, conduct of territorial government entities and those
entities empowered by internal law to exercise elements of government
authority as long as the entity is acting in such a capacity at the time the

19. See Christenson, supra note 17 at 323.
20. Draft Articles, supra note 11 at 326-7.
21. Article 7. Attribution ofthe State of the conduct of other entities empowered to exercise
elements of the governmental authority.
1. The conduct of an organ of a territorial government entity within a State shall also be
considered as an act of that State under international law, provided that organ was acting in that

capacity in the case in question.
2. The conduct of an organ of an entity which is not a part of the formal structure of the
State or of a territorial governmental entity, but which is empowered by the internal law of that State

to exercise elements of the governmental authority, shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in question.
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issue of responsibility is posed.2' Under Article 10 of the Draft Articles,
acts of such entities will also be attributed to the state even where the
entity exceeded its legal competence. 3 Under the ILC's approach, a
crucial condition for the attribution to the state of the behaviour of this
category of actor is that the latter acted in the capacity of a governmental
authority - analogous in many respects to private law agency tests,

although private law analogies do not fully describe this element at the
international level.2 4
The JIC does not deal directly with the issue of attribution to the
state of the acts of commercial entities with which the state may be

intimately involved 25 The relevant law to apply here must be found
either under the category of actors described as governmental authorities
(discussed above) or under that concerned with private persons.
The ILC's Draft Articles contain two provisions that deal with the
conduct of private individuals. Under Draft Articles 826 and 11,27 the

acts of private persons acting "in fact on behalf of the state" or in a
22. Id.
23. Article 10.Attribution to the State of conduct of organs acting outside their competence
or contrary to instructionsconcerning their activiy.
The conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity
empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority, such organ having acted in that
capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State under international law even if, in the particular
case, the organ exceeded its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions
concerning its activity.
24. See Christenson, supra note 17 at 326 (identifying the doctrinal debate over the "questionbegging use of private law analogies for wrongs to nations").
25. "Nowhere does the ILC appear to have dealt directly with the problem of how to treat
commercial entities with which the state is intimately involved but which possess a legal identity
distinct from the state." Smith, supra note 5, 28-29. The Commentary to Article 7(2) of the ILC
Draft Articles provides a definition of "entity" sufficiently broad to encompass commercial entities;
see Commentary in Rosenne, supra note 5, at 84.
26. Article 8.Attribution to the State of the conduct ofpersons actingin fact on behalf of the
State.
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the State
under international law if
(a) it is established that such person or group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of the
State; or
(b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental
authority in the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified the exercise
of those elements of authority.
The Commentary to Article 8 demonstrates the strict interpretation of this provision. Under Article
8(a), it must be genuinely proven that the person(s) involved was appointed by organs of the state
to discharge a particular function or duty on behalf of the state. Under 8(b), only exceptional
circumstances (such as a natural disaster, or war) will justify attribution to the state of conduct of
this category of actors.
27. Draft Articles, supra note 5 at 325-7.
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capacity exercising "governmental authority" will be attributed to the
state (again, an agency-type test); conversely, the conduct of persons not
acting on behalf of the state will not be attributed to the state, although
the state may nonetheless bear liability for "other conduct" related to the
activity of such category of actors.28 This important exception introduces a second level of potential liability for the state: active or omissive
conduct by the state relating to non-state actors. 29
The ILC limits the type of conduct that might be attributed to the
state by restrictively defining the categories of actors. Only those actors
that can be identified as governmental authorities, or acting in such a
capacity, are liable to have their actions attributed to the state. The
actions of actors falling outside of these two areas will not be directly
attributable to the state. However, actors' activities falling outside those
two categories may give rise to another state obligation, the breach of
which could implicate the state in an international wrong. The duty of
due diligence requires states to exercise due care in protecting the lives
and property of aliens on their territory and in ensuring that justice is
applied where injury to either has occurred. The state also must take
certain preventive measures to limit transboundary harm.3"
The operation of state responsibility principles may be demonstrated
through two simple examples.

28. Article 11. Conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the State.
1. The conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on behalf of the State shall not
be considered as an act of the State under international law.

2. Paragraph 1 is without prejudice to the attribution to the State of any other conduct which
is related to that of the persons or groups of persons referred to in that paragraph and which is to
be considered as an act of the State by virtue of articles 5 to 10.
29. This exception also relates to the conduct of the state with respect to organs of other states
and insurrectional movements; see Articles 12 and 14 of the Draft Articles.
30. Christenson, supranote 17 at 327, identifies three patterns of substantive norms governing

state activity based on the obligation not to cause intentional harm, not to cause harm by failing to
meet a due diligence standard and the affirmative duty to apprehend and punish wrongdoers.
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Example 1.
Gasworks, a private company from state A, signs a
production-sharing agreement with the government of
state B regarding the development of certain gas fields
in the northern regions of B. Having obtained the
necessary licence from the appropriate state supervisory
mining body, Gasworks contacts the local authority
of
the region with a view to commencing their drilling
operations. The local authority denies Gasworks the
right to proceed on the grounds that this contradicts the
development plans of the region, which have been
formulated in light of previous contacts with a local
company of the region.
The issue in this first example is whether state B is responsible for
the acts of the local authority. Responsibility may lie in this case because
the acts of the local authority can be considered as conduct of an entity
empowered with governmental authority (covered by Article 7 of the ILC
Draft Articles) and thus, attributable to state B.
The second example is drawn directly from the Banec case l
decided by the United States Supreme Court. The broad inquiry in this
scenario is whether DCorp may seek redress from State C.
Example 2.
Bank CC is country C's official bank for foreign trade
financing. Bank CC's bylaws describe its purpose as
"contributing to and collaborating with the international
trade policy of the government and the application of
the measures concerning foreign trade adopted by C's
Central Bank." Bank CC is governed by delegates from
C's government ministries and received its capital stock
from the government. Bank CC's functions are comparable to those usually managed by governments (even
in capitalist countries). DCorp, a foreign bank has
provided letters of credit and operating capital to Bank
CC, which suddenly is dissolved with losses to DCorp.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Banec found that "form was more important

31. First National City Bank v. Banco Pam El Comercio Exterior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611
(1983); 22 I.L.M. 840 (1983); see Jane Chalmers, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility: State
Responsibility of ParastatalsOrganizedin CorporateForm, 84 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 60, 61

(1990).
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than function"3 2 and held that the separate corporate identity of the
particular Bank in question had to be respected.3 3
Similar findings were made in other cases, 34 leading one commentator to conclude that "[t]he arbitral and judicial decisions in this area
generally accept without question the sanctity of corporate form." 35 In
theory, a parastatal entity organized in corporate form, relieves the state,
except in extraordinary circumstances, of responsibility even if the state
controls the corporation and it acts for the state's benefit. 36 That
commentator argues against such an approach and suggests that the rules
of attribution at the international law level ought to be governed by
private law theories of agency and that the test for attribution should be
the extent of control that the state exercises over the parastatal in
question.37
Such an approach is generally consistent with other commentators
on the subject. For example, Smith concludes:
"It would seem that the most appropriate key to attribution with respect
to commercial entities would be the state's own perspective of the
'public' character or function of the entity ...The state's own conduct
provides the best evidence of the state's definition of public versus
private commercial conduct." 38

32. Id.
33. Id. The Supreme Court, however, found equitable circumstances permitting the claim of
foreign bank to proceed. 462 U.S. 611 at 630-3.
34. The cases surveyed included: Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985);
Hercaire International Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559 (1987); Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 1989 WL
57704 (SDNY), and Czamikow v. Rolimpex [1979] App. Cas. 351 (U.K.). Summarizing these
decisions, Chalmers asserts, "[t]hese cases assume that a presumption of legal separation should
govern in the sphere of relations between a private sector corporation and its shareholder" and she
suggests that this strict limitation of liability approach with such a high threshold for piercing the
corporate veil, should not automatically be imported in public sector cases. 84 PROC. AM. Soc'Y
INT'L. L. 62-63 (1990).
35. Id. Chaimers is legal advisor at.the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a
U.S. Government agency responsible for insuring foreign investment risks. OPIC will insure ventures
only where there is chance that the agency might recover claims paid by subrogated actions against
the host government based on that state's responsibility.
36. Id.
37. Id., at 64. Christenson, supra note 17 at 327, discusses this issue and endorses the
questions raised by Clive Parry in "Some Considerations upon the Protection of Individuals in
International Law", 90 R.C.A.D.I. II 657 (1956) and by Ian Brownlie in PRINCiPLES OF PUBLIC
INTEmNATIONAL LAW, at 434-435 (3d ed. 1979).
38. SMITH, supra note 5 at 30. See also Arghyrios A. Fatouros, TransnationalEnterprisein
the Law of State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJRIES
TO ALIENS at 361 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1983).
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Seidl-Hohenveldern looks to the nature of the conduct involved, but is
less conclusive about the results of his survey of the jurisprudence in the
field:
"[t]he distinction between a state and its corporations ... becomes
irrelevant in the field of state responsibility under international law,
when acts ofjure imperii character are done by corporations, whether
state-owned or not, and by private persons."39
He believes that such "acts will be attributed to the state if done on the
latter's order or instigation."4
Dupuy refers to the "paradox" between the approaches in international jurisprudence regarding attribution of the conduct of private
persons compared with that of parastatals." He questions why the
principle of "effectivity" should apply to conduct relating to the first
category of actor and not to that concerning the second?4 2 Caron,
analyzing the practice of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, argues that that
organ's work has been "stifled" by its rigid application of the rules of
attribution contained in the ILC Draft Articles.4 3 He proposes that a
more reasonable approach might utilize the notion of causation - as
opposed to the all-or-nothing result of the attribution rules. Under his
approach, the state could be held responsible for the conduct of private
persons where that conduct was a foreseeable consequence of an act of
the state.' Higgins adds a dimension to the overall issue by asking
whether states should not be held internationally responsible for their
acta jure gestionis, including all unlawful commercial acts?4"
However, the American Law Institute in Section 207 of its
Restatement on Foreign Relations Law follows to a large extent the ILC
Draft Articles:

39.

IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, CORPORATIONS IN AND UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW at

58-

59, 63-64 (1987) (reviewing the relevant jurisprudence from the perspective of act jure imperii and

acts jure gestionis). Professor Seidl-Hohenveldem refers with agreement to the position taken in
Ibrahim Shihata, Role ofLaw in Economic Development: The Legal Problem ofInternationalPublic
Ventures, 25 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL 125 (1969).
40. Id.
41. See the commentary by Pierre M. Dupuy, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility, 84
PRoc. AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. 72, 73 (1990).
42. Id.
43. David Caron, Attribution Issues in State Responsibility: Attribution Amidst Revolution:
The Experience of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal, 84 PRoC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 64, 71
(1990).
44. Id., 70-71.
45. HIGGINS, supra note 15 at 152.
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207. Attribution of Conduct to States.

A state is responsible for any violation of its obligations
under international law resulting from action or inaction by
(a) the government of the state,
(b) the government or authorities of any political subdivision of the state, or
(c) any organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent
of a government or of any political subdivision, acting
within the scope of authority or under colour of such
authoritY. 4
The law of state responsibility analyzed above suggests three
propositions which may relate to the ECT:
1. Conduct by regional government entitities, authorities or private
persons empowered with governmental authority and acting in such a
capacity in breach of international obligations will be attributed to the
state.
2. Conduct by private persons not acting on behalf of the state will not
be attributed to the state. In this situation, however, the state may be
liable for acts or omissions on its behalf relating to such conduct. This
obligation arises under the primary duty of due diligence.
3. The existing rules of state responsibility do not provide clear rules
with respect to the attribution to the state of conduct of parastatal
entities, including state enterprises, or other non-state actors involved
in commercial activity.
ITI.

THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (ECT).

The next step is to examine whether the rules of general international law relating to state responsibility apply to the state-parties of the
ECT. Are the obligations contained in the ECT consistent with the
general international law in the area or are new obligations created?
Signed in 1994 by 49 countries, the ECT is aimed at regulating
investment and trade in the particular sector of energy and related
resources. The key principles of the ECT are nondiscrimination
(national treatment) and most favoured treatment for investors. 47
Central to the investor-protection regime of the ECT are the obligations
spelled out in Articles 22 and 23.
Article 22 of the ECT sets forth the obligations of the state parties

46. 1 RESTATEMENT

OF THE LAW THIRD, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

96 (1987).
47. See Vaelde "International Investment", supra note 2.

STATES
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for "state enterprises" and "entities" described collectively under the
heading, "State and Privileged Enterprises":
Article 22. State and PrivilegedEnterprises.
(1) Each Contracting Party shall ensure that any state
enterprise which it maintains or establishes shall conduct its
activities in relation to the sale or provision of goods and
services in its Area in a manner consistent with the Contracting Party's obligations under Part IH of this Treaty.
(2) No Contracting Party shall encourage or require such
a state enterprise to conduct its activities in its Area in a
manner inconsistent with the Contracting Party's obligations
under other provisions of this Treaty.
(3) Each Contracting Party shall ensure that if it establishes or maintains an entity and entrusts the entity with
regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority,
such entity shall exercise that authority in a manner consistent with the Contracting Party's obligations under this
Treaty.
(4) No Contracting Party shall encourage or require any
entity to which it grants exclusive or special privileges to
conduct its activities in its Area in a manner inconsistent
with the Contracting Party's obligations under this Treaty.
(5) For the purposes of this Article, "entity" includes any
enterprise, agency or other organization or individual.
Article 22 creates a primary obligation of contracting states to be
responsible for the conduct of state enterprises and entities. By making
the contracting states responsible in the first instance for regulating and
supervising the activities of state and privileged enterprises, the ECT
solves the problems inherent in an attribution-based approach to state
responsibility. Instead of seeking to attribute to the state acts of organs
that may fall outside of Article 7 of the ILC Draft Articles, the ECT
makes the contracting states directly liable for the actions of its
enterprises and entities, each of which have been broadly defined.
Article 23 covers regional and local governments and authorities
under the umbrella term "subnational authorities". Article 23 adopts an
approach to subnationals similar to that of Article 22 with respect to state
enterprises. State parties to the ECT are required to take "reasonable
measures" to regulate the activities of regional and local governments
insofar as the ratione materiae of the ECT.

19971

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

Article 23. Observance by SubnationalAuthorities.
(1) Each Contracting Party is fully responsible under this
Treaty for the observance of all provisions of the Treaty,
and shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure such observance by regional and local
governments and authorities within its Area.
(2) The dispute settlement provisions in Parts II, IV and
V of this Treaty may be invoked in respect of measures
affecting the observance of the Treaty by a Contracting
Party which have been taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the Area of the Contracting
Party.
Article 23 requires contracting states to use reasonable efforts in
supervising the actions of regional and local governments and authorities.
This reflects to some degree the difficulties associated with a federal
system and might be aimed at the particular case of the Commonwealth
of Independent States. The softness of subparagraph one of Article 23 is
mitigated somewhat by the contents of subparagraph two which provides
that the ECT dispute settlement provisions may be invoked against a
state party for actions taken by regional or local governments. That is,
Article 22 extends the regulatory and supervisory obligations (and thus
control) of contracting states with respect to state enterprises and entities
through direct, authoritative, prescription ("shall ensure"). Article 23
implicates the state indirectly for the action of subnational authorities
through the threat of the dispute resolution mechanisms referred in
subsection (2). This is as far as the ECT permits intrusion into domestic
politics. The interrelationship between federal and subnational authorities
is likely, in some cases, to be beyond unilateral control by the state.4"
The drafters of the ECT have employed a formula that circumvents this
problem by making the state liable for the conduct of subnationals
indirectly through the application of the dispute settlement provisions of
the Treaty.
The substantive norm contained in Article 23 is less categorical than
that adopted by the LLC in Article 7 of its Draft Articles which attributes
to the state the conduct of territorial government entities.49 However, the
threat of exposure to dispute settlement requirements in the ECT might
succeed in accomplishing indirectly what may have been impossible

48. For example, the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserves to state governments
a reservoir of power apart and distinct from the federal national government.
49. Draft Articles, supra note 5.
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directly. The overall goal of protecting investors from domestic practices
inconsistent with the ECT has been preserved and the state is made
overall guarantor of the Treaty's obligations, despite the independence of
regional or local governments or authorities.

IV.

CONCLUSION.

General international law, in its current state, is inadequate to deal
with the complex issues arising out of the wrongful acts of non-state
actors in the area of international economic law. However, recent
developments indicate an appreciation of the problems involved and a
move towards remedying the shortcomings of the law in the area. The
ECT provides one example of how these issues may be addressed in the
context of international commercial relations. The creation of treaty-based
rules for states regarding the conduct of non-state actors can circumvent
the cumbersome application of the attribution rules used in the traditional
state responsibility model."
The ECT establishes direct obligations for the contracting parties
regarding the conduct of state enterprises, entities and subnationals in the
energy sector. Insofar as subnational authorities are concerned, stateparties are held to a standard of due diligence to "take such reasonable
measures as may be available" to ensure compliance with the Treaty by
regional and local governments. This obligation is strengthened by the
fact that actions of regional and local governments and authorities may
implicate the state through the dispute settlement provisions of the
5
Treaty. 1
Article 22 of the ECT is more innovative than Article 23 in that it
extends the state's obligations to control, regulate and supervise state
enterprises and entities in all areas related to the ECT. Through this
mechanism, the Treaty precludes the necessity of reverting to the rules
of attribution in the quest for assigning state responsibility from the
conduct of state enterprises or entities. The ECT makes the contracting
state liable for its failure to ensure that these organs act in compliance
with the Treaty. Through this means, the state is held directly account50. Christenson, supra note 17 at 345-346 lists three positive functions of the attribution
doctrine, suggesting, in short, that attribution principles bridge the gap between public and private
spheres of responsibility and offer the possibility for developing substantive norms in the field. In
addition, attribution principles offer the means to apply sanctions to achieve the goals of primary
norms.
51. ECT, art. 23(2), supra note I at 397.
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able for actions of potentially non-state actors and this should be an
added insurance to investors. This approach goes beyond the ILC's
scheme which, founded on an attribution-based model, requires first that
the entities involved be confirmed to have been exercising governmental
authority before the state can be implicated for the conduct of such
actors. The ECT extends the breadth of a state-party's liability by making
the conduct of state enterprises and entities in the energy sector the2
responsibility of the contracting-state. As such, the Banec-type case1
is less a possibility under the ECT, although clearly the residual rules of
state responsibility
apply to fill the gaps left by the lex specialis of the
53
ECT
Whether the regime established by the ECT will be successful in
resolving the relevant issues in the field of state responsibility remains
to be seen. Left to be answered also is the broader question of how the
complexities of state responsibility will be resolved in the area of
international economic relations generally.

52. Supra note 31 and accompanying text.
53. There may exist cases where the conduct of state enterprises, entities or subnational
authorities will have to be attributed to the state for responsibility to arise, although Articles 22 and
23 of the ECT make this a secondary route of going after the state.
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TABLE I: Fundamental elements of State Responsibility under the ILC
Draft Articles
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State
Elements

Qualification

conduct (an action or omission
that constitutes a breach of an
international obligation)

"objective" test

attributable to the State under
international law

"subjective" test

TABLE II: Conditions Affecting the Final Determination of an Internationally Wrongful Act of the State under the ILC Draft Articles
No internationally wrongful act of the State where the following
special conditions apply:
Special Conditions

ILC Provisions

(a) in the case involving
injury to private persons,
local remedies have not been
exhausted

Article 22
Exhaustion of Local Remedies
(every state has the right to
"correct the result" of its
conduct with respect to aliens)

(b) in all cases, where there
exist circumstances precluding
the wrongfulness of the act

Articles 29-34 (consent;
countermeasures; force
majeure; distress; necessity;
self-defence)

1997]

STATE RESPONSIBILYIY

TABLE IT: Rules of Attribution under the ILC Draft Articles
Categories of Actors Relevant to State Attribution Issues
Conduct Will Be Attributed
Organ(s) of the state having
that status under internal law
& acting in that capacity,
regardless of the position of
the organ*

Conduct Will Not Be
Attributed
Person(s) not acting on
behalf of the state**
(Art. 11)

(Art. 5 & 6)
Organ(s) of a territorial
governmental entity or
organs of entities empowered
to act in such a capacity,
acting in that capacity*
(Art. 7(1)(2))

Organ of another state"
(Art. 12)

Person(s) acting in fact on
behalf of the state
(Art. 8)

Organ of an international
organization
(Art. 13)

Act of an insurrectional
movement that becomes the
new government**
* regardless of whether the

Organ of an insurrectional
movement*

organ exceeded its
competence or contravened
instructions
(Art. 10)

without prejudice to
attribute to the state other
conduct related to conduct by
this category of actor
(Art. 11(2); 12(2); 14(2))
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TABLE IV: Attribution Rules for State Enterprises, Entities & Subnationals under the ILC Draft Articles
Attribution Rules Involving Subnational Entities
Conduct Will Be Attributed
Organ(s) of a territorial
governmental entity within a
state or organs of entities not
part of the formal structure of
the state or a territorial
governmental entity, but
empowered by internal law to
exercise elements of the
governmental authority,
acting in that capacity*
(Art. 7(1)(2))***

Conduct Will Not Be
Attributed
Person(s) not acting on
behalf of the state*
(Art. 11)

Person(s) acting in fact
on behalf of the State or
exercising elements of the
governmental authority in
the absence of the official
authorities and in circumstances which justified the
exercise of those elements of
authority
(Art. 8)***
* regardless

of whether the

organ exceeded its competence
or contravened instructions
(Art. 10)

"* without prejudice to attribute to the state other conduct re
lated to conduct by this category
of actor
(Art. 11(2))

***In all cases not expressly covered in Articles 7 & 8, the conduct is in
"no circumstances" attributable to the state regardless of whether there
is a causal link (see ILC Commentary to Articles 7 & 8).

